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Summary
This paper introduces endogenous adoption costs for produc-
tive assets in a Ramsey type growth model with internation-
al capita L flows. There are two cIasses of productive assets:
owner-specific and location-specific. Adoption costs are an
increasing function of the leve! of technology embodied in the
investor's owner-specific assets and a declining function of the
host country's loca tion-specific assets. In this setting the
observed pattern of international capital flows is consistent
with diminishing returns to capita!. Further, our mod el pre-
dicts the sectoral allocation of investment and output ob-
served in the South.
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1. Introduction *
Capital does flow from rich to poor countries, but both stocks and flows are highly
concentrated in a fewnewly industrialized countres. This investment pattem seems
to be at odds with the neoclassical growth model which exhibits diminishing retus
to capitaL. The neoclassical model predicts that the retum to capital is highest in
relatively capital-poor countries, and as a consequence, capital should flow from rich
to poor countries if it is intemationally mobile. However, empirical evidence suggests
that the rate of retum to. capital is not higher in capital-poor than in capital-rich
countres (World Ban, 1989; Bardhan, 1996). This finding has induced a shift in
research emphasis from imperfections in the intemational capital markets to analyses
of what determines the rate of retum to capital, usually in the context of endogenous
growth models.
There are two main strands of endogenous growth models which are concemed with
the low rate of retum to capital in relatively capital-poor countries. Both concentrate
on foreign directinvestment (Fni), and both explain the coexistence of relative capital
scarcity and low retus to capital by the complementarty between intemationally
mobile capital and another factor of production which is not intemationally mobile.
The first strand argues that the immobile, complementary factor of production is
human capital (Uzawa, 1965; Lucas, 1988; 1990; 1993; Fafchamps, 1995; Barro,
. I am grateful to Magnus Hatlebak, Kjell Eri Lommerud, Trond Olsen, Para Sen, Anthony
Venables, paricìpants at the Norwegian Economics Association's research conference in Oslo Januar
1999, and paricipants at the DEGIT conference in Tilburg, July 1999 for useful comments to this and
a previous version of the paper.
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Mankiw and Sala-i-Martin, 1995; Stokey 1996). Poor countries are assumed to be in
relatively short supply ofhuman capital, and relatively meager flows of Fni follòw.
The second strand argues that intermediate goods and services are non-tradable and
complementary to capital. In ths literatue, productivity is determined by the degree
of specialization, which in turn is determined by the extent of the market. Since small
or poor countres have small markets, the degree of specialization is shallow, and the
return to the primar factors of production is low as a consequence (Faini, 1984;
Rodriguez-Clare, 1996). There is, however, little empirical evidence that intermediate
goods and services are non-tradable. To the contrary, they constitute a significant and
increasing share of world trade (WTO 1999). Moreover, small countries tend to have
a similar input-output strcture as larger countres, but the import share of
intermediate goods and services is higher (Chenery et. aL., 1986).
In this paper we build on the first strand by analyzing the impact of complementarities
between classes of capital that differ with respect to international mobility. However,
our model differs from previous research in four important ways. First, while
previous papers typically assume that factors are either perfectly mobile between
countries or they do not move across international boundares at all, we wish to
analyze the more general case wlth imperfect international capital flows.
Second, we reinterpret the two types of capital to represent owner-specific and
location-specific capital. Owner-specific capital refers to assets which firms have
acquired through diverting resources from productive activities and which have a
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higher return when employed in this paricular firm than if employed elsewhere.
Assets such as technology, work organization, managerial systems, firm-specific skils
and made-to-measure machinery and equipment fall into this category. Location-
specific capital refers to assets whichcan not easily be transported or transferred from
one location to another, and which foreign investors consider exogenous when they
take location decisions. The rule oflaw, contract enforcehient - including intellectual
property rights, the generalievel of education and infrastrctue fall into the location-
specific assets category. Some ofthese assets have characteristics ofpublic goods and
can be modeled as services from public investments.
By making the distinction between location-specific and owner-specific capital, we
build on insights from industri al organization-based theories of Fnl. This literature
sees Fni as a strategi c decision by individual companies on where to locate value-
adding activities. Such decisions are drven by the urge to find the most efficient way
of combining the firm's owner,.specific assets with the host countr's location-specific
assets for each value-adding activity (nunning, 1993; UNCTAn, 1998).1 This
behavior translates into a maximization problem, which is the micro-foundation for
the model developed in this paper. Through this reinterpretation we are able to focus
sharlyon the capital mobility-dimension. In our context, human capital maý well be
owner-specific and internationally mobile, while physical capital assets may be
internationally immobile.
1 Even when location specific assets are combined with firm-specific assets of foreign companies, this
does not necessarly result in FDI. Alternative arangements are joint ventures, licensing or simply
selling owner-specific assets to foreign firms. In addition to fmding a profit maximizing combination
of owner-specific and location-specific assets, there must also be benefits to combining these assets
within the organization of a multinational fir. These aspects are discussed in Dunning (1993) and
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Third, as a consequence of our reinterpretation of the two types of capital, we
maintain labor as a separate factor of production. This is necessary because human
capital can be assumed to be embodied in workers, while location-specific capital can
not. Labor is assumed to be in fixed supply. Finally and most significantly, .our
model differs from former models regarding the nature of externalities related to
location-specific capital accumulation. The externality in out model reduces the
adoption cost of owner-specific capitaL. The existence of such adoption costs is
indicated in several studies. ne Long and Summers (1991) forexample, find that the
real relative cost of capital goods seems to be particularly high in developing
countres. We argue that it is reasonable to assume that adoption costs increase with
the degree of sophistication of the asset in which investment is made, and decline with
the stock of location-specific assets in the host countr, hence the externality. By
combining adoption costs and differentiated owner-specific assets, we are able to
analyze both the amount and the composition of Fni flowing to the South.
We show that in this setting, the observed international capital flows are consistent
with decreasing marginal retums to capital. Further, our model predicts a composition
of Fni compatible with the observation that poor countres receive Fni in
technologically sophisticated activities. Thus, the model is consistent with the
observation that even the poorest countries of the world are linked to the Internet and
receive Fni in mobile telephone networks, although the relative price of such serices
are very high. The next section of the paper presents the model, while section 3 draws
some policy implications and concludes.
Markusen (1995), the latter within a static modeling framework. The benefits of internalization are,
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2. The model
A Ramsey-type growth model with two types of accumulated assets is developed.
The two types of assets are owner-specific, denoted K, and location-specific, denoted
G. Factor income can be spent on consumer goods or saved, while savings are
invested in G or K, the latter at home or abroad. A world with a fixed common stock
of technology in the form of n blueprints is presupposed. Each blueprint represents a
technology which firms may transform into owner-specific assets. Such assets are
ranked according to the amount of technology embodied in them. The aggregate stock
of K in the economy is therefore given by:
n
K = ¿Ä!K¡ (1)
and is the sum of technology-adjusted assets defined by a quantity parameter K¡ and a
quality parameter, Â!, Â:; 1. A cost of transforming each blueprint into productive
assets is incurred by firms and increases with the level of sophistication of the
technology. Assume that quality O is a standardized asset that can be bought off the
shelf. Next, the owner-specific assets are adopted to the location-specific assets in a
particular country. The cost of doing so is assumed to decline with the per capita
stock of location-specific assets in the host countr. It is common in endogenous
growt models to assume that productivity in individual firms depends on the total
stock of capital rather than the per capita stock. The argument behind this is that
capital accumulation induces the accumulation of knowledge that is non-rival and
however difficult to incorporate in a growth mode!, and we abstraet from it here.
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non-excludable. It is therefore the total stock rather than the per capita stock that
matters for knowledge spilovers. Unfortately, this yields a scale effect in the rate
of growth, which appears to beat odds with empirical evidence.2
We argue that accumulation of location-speeific assets sueh as a high level of
education, good infrastreture and good institutions is subject to externalities that
reduces the cost of adopting sophisticated technology to a particular location, but that
there are congestion effects as well. In addition, location-specific assets include land
and natual resources, which are clearly subject to congestion or diminishing returns.
By making the adoption eost dependent on the per capita stock of loeation-specific
assets we incorporate the eongestion effect and avoid the scaleeffect on growth rates.
The adoption eost function reads:
.JijJ
c. = Ti (GI Lyi-a-riia (2)
We restrict the parameter values such that (1- a-;jl a -o 1.3 This ensures that the cost
reduction effect of an additional unit of per capita location-specific assets is
diminishing. Equation (2) has a proven empirical foundation when location-specific
assets are limited to human capital. Several studies have included the log of initial
Gnl times the stock of human capital, represented by the level of education and the
life expectancy, in growth regressions in order to capture the interaction between Gnl
and human capitaL. It is assumed that a higher level ofhuman capital raises the ability
2 See for example Jones (1995) for a discussion.
3 This implies that the share of factor income that accrues to "raw labor" is smaller than the share the
accrues to owner-specific assets.
6
to absorb new technologies and therefore speeds up the convergence process. As
expected, the interaction varable is found to be inversely related to real growth (Barro
and Sala-i-Martin, 1995).
Equation (2) introduces adoption costs proportional to the complexity of the
production process, and inversely proportional to the accumulated stock of location-
specific assets per worker. By so doing it captures the empirical relationship found in
Barro and Sala-i-Marin (1995), provided that our broader definition of location-
specific assets has a similar effect as the more narow definition ofhuman capital. As
a consequence of (2) and the fact that countres have different endowments of
location-specific assets, adoption costs differ among countres. Adoption costs are
assumed to be of the iceberg type which means that one unt of savings is transformed
to 1/ Ci .. 1 units of owner-specific assets of quality i. The stock of effective capital of
quality i employedin the economy is therefore given by:
K. =K./c.ii i (3)
Firmj produces final goods subject to the production function:
Y. = L1-:a-y G(~'()!fJ K. .)a) ) ) L. I,) (4)
or in terms of output per worker:
7
n ( ry ifl AY j = g j L Â ki,j
i=O
(4')
where Y is total output of final goods or factor income. With this specification,
varieties of the owner-specific assets are not direct substitutes or complements to each
other, but we note that location-specific assets and owner-specific assets are
complementary. The formulation is similar to Grossman and Helpman (1992) and
Barro and Sala-i-Marin (1995). We do not explain advances in technology, but take
the number of ideas or blueprints as given. We follow the two previous papers and
assume that for each asset, the state of the art version is adopted. We do, however,
make the additional assumption that assets can be ranked according to productivity or
quality. For example, ifthe accumulated investment in organizational assets and firm-
specific ~owledge are the same, the marginal productivity of investment in
organizational assets may be higher than the marginal productivity of firm-specific
knowledge.
The production fuction (4) exhibits constait returns to scale. Using (1) and (3), (4')
can be written as:
y j = T-a gj gl-a-y i:lf1!fl ki,j t
i=O
(5)
For each individual firm that takes g as a given parameter, the production function is
stil standard Cobb-nouglas with constant returns to scale in Gj, ~, and Lj. Let us
now turn to the investment-decision of firms. Assume that savings or financial assets
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are allocated among the countries of the world such that they earn the same rate of
return everyhere. The stock of quality i invested and employed is thus determined by
the profit maximizatiön problem given the world market interest rate, which, applying
(5) yields:
k. . = ral'-a g~ g1-a-r ißa I(r + t5l/(1-a)l,) ~ ) (6)
Equation (6) yieldsthe following distrbution of investment on quality rungs of capital
in firmj:
k - r -a r 1-a-r I( X\l/(l-a)O,j - Lal' g j g r + v J
k . = ral'-a g~ g1-a-r )fa I(r + t5l/(1-a) = k .J/a/(l-a)1,) ~ ) O,) (7)
k . = ral'-a g~ g1-a-r Jinßa I(r + t5l/(1-a) = k . Jinßa/(1-a)n ,) ~ o,)
The distrbution of investment on owner-specific assets is ilustrated by figure 2.1.
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Figure 2.1: Nominal and effective investment4
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Figue 2.1 depicts the distribution of investment and employment of owner-specific
assets for three levels of location-specific assets per worker. The points show the
nominal investment levels while the bars show the effective investment, e.g., k¡ and
A
ki, respectively. For the parameters chosen, nominal investment increases with the
quality ofthe asset, while the installed productive capital declines with quality. Thus,
adoption costs drive a wedge between savings and investment, and this wedge
increases with the quality of the asset. Note that the small er the stock of location-
specific assets employed by the firm, the small er the total amount of nominal
investment, and the larger is the proportion of nominal investment that is spent on
adopting owner-specific assets to the production process in the company. However,
the distribution of effective investment on the quality rungs in terms of percentages of
total effective investment is the same whatever the level of location-specific assets.
4 The figure is drawn for a. = 0.2, ß = 0.5, Y = 0.61, Â. = 1.2, t = 11,8 = 0.05, r = 0.05.
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We have now shown how savings that are invested by a company are transformed into
owner-specific assets and adopted to the location-specific assets in a chosen location.
This discussion relates to investment decisions in general, not necessarily foreign
investment. In the next section we wil analyze foreign investment withn the
framework of a growth model for an economy open to international capital flows. In
order to do so, we need to interpret the model in terms of Fni and we need to
aggregate the production function into one macro production function.
2.1 Equilbrium growth with capital mobilty, market solution
In this section we derive the growth rate for a market economy open to international
capital flows. Location-specific assets are now interpreted as the internationally
immobil e assets of a country, as indicated in the introductory section. Owner-specific
assets are interpreted as the assets that multinational firms have acquired. These
assets are internationally mobile, but subject to the adoption costs represented by
equation (2). The equilbrium rate of retu to nominal investment, e.g., the return to
savings made available to the investors, must be equal to the world interest rate in this
setting. The driving force for Fni is investment in location-specific assets. Theyare
complementar to owner-specific assets such that changes in the stock of location-
specific assets wil result in inflows or outflows of owner-specific assets.
Production of final goods is assumed to be perfectly competitive, and consumers are
assumed to have homothetic preferences. Then final output produced by firms can be
aggregated into one composite consumption good, while the individual firms' constant
returns to scale production function can be aggregated into one macro production
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function. The subscriptj can be omitted from the production fuction (5). Combining
(5) and (7) yields:
y = T~a gr gi-a-rk; (1 + 1 + 12 +... + 1n)a (8)
where 1 = .lal(l-a). We have split the location-specific asset into two entres in the
production function; a direct input in the production of final goods and an indirect
contrbution that works through adoption costs. Individual investors do not take the
latter into account when making investment decisions in a market economy, and the
distinction is useful when the steady state growth path of the economy is derived.
Note that the macro production fuction exhibits increasing tetus to scale in L, G
and K. The quality parameters constitute a geometrical series. The production
function can therefore be wrtten as:
_ -a(1-1nJa r (l-a-r)kaY-T -- gg o1-Â (9)
In this macroeconomic setting, the qualityparameters can have the same interpretation
as they had in section 2.1, representing different types of assets that are employed by
all firms, and which can be ranedaccording to quality or productivity. An
alternative interpretation is to see the aggregate consumer good as composed of a
number of goods and services from an equal number of industries. Industres are
raned according to how sophisticated their technology is, and each technology
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matches a quality rong of owner-specific assets. As wil be shown below, this
interpretation has some interesting implications.
Factor income is consumed or saved according to consumers' utility maximization
problem. Infinitely lived households maximize the standard constant intertemporal
elasticity of substitution utility function:
00 ei-e -1
u(e) = f. e-Ødtt 1-8 (10)
where e is consumption per household, p is the time preference rate and 8 is the,
elasticity of marginal utility.
To make the analysis tractable, we assume that the constraint on capital mobility is
binding such that all owner-specific assetsare provided from foreign savings. The
accumulation of location-specific assets, or theeconomy's budget constraint is then
given by:
g = (l-a)y-e-6gg (11)
The share of factor income that accroe to foreign investors, a., is subtracted from total
factor income. Let us now assume that each household supply one unit of labor
inelastically and households can be represented by one representative worker who also
provides savings for investment in location-specific assets. Finally, assume that the
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number of households is constant over time. Then the Hamiltonian representing the
representative households intertemporal optimization problem reads:
1 ( A Ja JCI-8 -1 1- Â,nJ = e-Ø + (1- a)i--a -- .gY gi-a-y k~ - c - c5l-B 1-Â,
The optimization problem facing the individual is to maximize J with respect to the
first factor g. Maximization yields the familiar Euler equation:
L ( A Ja Ji: 1 -a 1- Â,n ko- =- r(l-a)i---- -6- pc B 1-Â, g
It can easily be shown that the first order conditions of the local and the foreign
investors' profit maximization problem respectively yields
g /ko = r(r + 5)/ a(rg + 6g). Jf savings are perfectly internationally mobile, the local
interest rate must equal the world market interest rate. If the two types ofassets have
the same rate of depreciation, the ratio of accumulated nominal investment in owner- .
specific assets to accumulated stock of location-specific assets equals their relative
share in total factor income. In the following we wil assume that the depreciation
rate is the same for both types of assets. Then we can use the condition that the g/ko =
¡I a, and the Euler equation yields the growth path of the economy:
L ( A Ja Ji: 1 -a 1 - Â,n a- = - .r(l-a)i- --- -6- pc B 1-Â, r (12)
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The model yields endogenous growth iff Y(1_a)i--a(1-1: aJa )o iS + p. Note that
1-Â y
there is no scale effect. The growth rate is higher the small er is the adoption cost
parameter 't, the larger is the number ofblueprints n, available to the economy and the
larger is Â. It can be shown that in steady state the rate of growth of per capita
consumption, output and the nominal capital stock is the same, see Barro and Sala-i-
Marin (1995). Thus, in steady state, the flow of nominal FDI is a function of the
growth rate of the economy, while the accumulated stock is a function of the stock of
location-specific assets. Since individual investors do not take the externality into
account, the market solution is most likely suboptimal. In order to obtain the optimal
growth rate of the economy, we turn to a social planner who takes the externality into
account when investment decisÌons are being made.
2.2 The socially optimal growth rate
In this section we derve the socially optimal growth rate for an economy open to
international capital flows. We maintain the assumption that the constraint on
international capital flows is binding such that all investment in owner-specific capital
is financed from abroad. Given the natue of location-specific assets, it is reasonable
to assume that govemments are involved in such investments either through public
investment or subsidized private investment. The local Ìnvestor is therefore
represented by a social planner who take the adoption cost externality into account
when making the investment decision. The Hamiltonian in this case Ìs:5
5 The production fuction now takes the form of an AK -production function.
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1-8 1 (An Ja J
. J - c -1 -¡: (1 ) -a 1- Â l-aka k-- e + -a T ~ g o c-u¿l-B 1-Â
Optimization with respect to g yields the Euler equation:
L ( A Ja Jë 1 2 -a 1- Ân a-=- (l-a) T ~- -tS-pc B 1-Â 1 (13)
The socially optimum growth rate is higher than the market solution, since
(1- a)2 :; 1(1- a) requires that 1 - a - 1:; O, which is always the case. This implies,
as usual in this kind of growth models, that there is room for policy measures that
improve growth performance compared to the market solution. We turn to such
policy measures in section 3. But before we go into a policy discussion, let us
recapture the findings on Fni in countries that are poor in location-specific assets.
In section 2 where we looked at investment decisions in a static setting, we found that
investments in owner-specific assets in a particular location increases with the stock
oflocation-specific assets. Further, the wedge between thenominal and the effective
investment is wider the small er the stock of location-specific assets per capita and the
more sophisticated the asset. Applying equations (3) and (4), it turns out that the
marginal product of the nominal and effective stock of each rung of owner-specific
assets are related as follows:
MPÎ(; = MPk.c~/(1-a) = (r + tS)c~/(1-a)i l i , (14)
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The rate of return to the effective capital stock is thus above the world market interest
rate in capital-poor countres. Condition (14) reconciles our model with the
observation that the return to savings do es not differ much between countries in spite
of the fact that developing countres are relatively poor in capitaL. In other worlds, the
return to savings are not higher in capital-poor countres, but the returns to installed,
productive capital is higher, as predicted by the neoclassical growth modeL. Since it
is the rate of return to savings that matters to the international investor, capital wil
only trckle to poor countres if poor countres are also poor in location-specific assets.
Neverheless, from equations (12) and (13) it is clear that the steady state growth rate
of the nominal stock of owner-specific capital is the same in all countries if the
parameter values are the same in all countres. Again there is empirical evidence that
the stock of Fni as a share of the total capital stock in poor countres is not
signficantly different from the equivalent ratio in rich countries (UNCT An 1998).
. This does, however imply that poor countres wil not catch up.
3. Policy implications and some empirical evidence
In the absence of a social planner, thegovemment can introduce a subsidy in the
market solution and thereby replicate the socially optimal solution. It can easily be
shown that the adequate subsidy must be levied on investment in location-specific
capital at the rate (1-a)/y. Policies for higher growth should in other words be
directed towards stimulating the accumulation of location-specific assets, rather than
designing investment incentives for foreign investors. When poor countres compete
for Fni, this conclusion is reinforced. In such a situation investment incentives for
foreign investors in the form of tax holidays and subsidies could lead to a "race to the
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bottom" in terms of resources available for domestic development. Investment in
location-specific assets on the other hand, induces Fni and a "race to the top," since
investors are attracted by assets that are often valuable in their own right in this case.
To summarize the findings of ths paper, we have found that countres that are poor in
location-specific assets have a low return to Fni and therefore receive meager inflows
of Fnl. Further, we have seen that the composition of Fni in terms of the quality of
owner-specific assets are similar in rich and poor countries, but the wedge between
nominal and effective investment is higher in poor countres, and more so the more
sophisticated the assets. Finally, we have seen that the growth rate of the stock of Fni
is similar in rich and poor countries.
If we interpret the macro production fuction as an aggregate of industries that can be ,
raned according to how sophisticated the assets employed in the production process,
then our findings imply that the relative price ofgoods and services produced by high-
technology industries are paricularly high in developing countres. One piece of
anecdotal evidence is provided: as a proxy of relative prices we look at one lo w-
technology product and one high-technology product that are comparable and
consumed in most countres of the world. We have chosen a loaf of bread and one
minute of cell-phone convetsation during office homs. We have only a few
observations on this; in Norway one loaf of bread can buy about 7 minutes of cell-
phone conversation, in N ainibia about 2 minutes, South Afrca about 1 minute and in
Tanzania a loaf ofbread can buy only 28 seconds of cell phone conversation.
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nata on sectoral composition on Fni is scarce, and it is diffcult to find comparable
data for different countres. We therefore limit ourselves to reporting the sectoral
compositiön of Fni in a fewdeveloping countries and compare them to the sectoral
composition of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) on a global scale for 1998. The
latter data are reported in Miyake and Thomsen (1999). M&A accounts for about 60
percent of Fni in all advanced countres, 80 petcent of Fni in the United States and
85 percent in Australia. Data on M&A flows should therefore be reasonably
representative for total Fni flows. Table 1 reports the percentage distrbution of
M&A on the top 20 industries.
Table 1: Mergers and acquisitions by industr, 1998
Industry
Oil and gas
Automotive
Bang and finance
Telecommunications
Paperproducts, pritig and publishing
Utilities
Insurance
Business services
Chemicals
Retail
Food, dr and tobacco
Manufacturing, non-metallc products
Electrcal and electronIc engineerig
Instrent engineerig
Real estate
Wholesale distrbution
Leisure
Manufacturig, metallc products
Hotels and catering
Mechancal engineerig
Source: KPMG as reported in OECD 1999
Share of total value of M&A
14.0
9.4
9.3
9.2
7.5
7.3
7.0
6.9
4.5
3.3
2.8
2.0
1.8
1.
1.3 .
1.2
1.
1.0
0.8
0.8
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Natural resource-intensive industries, service industres and capital-intensive and/or
high-technology industries dominate this tab le. 6 The top 10 recipient industres of
Fni in Mexico during the period 1994-97 and Thailand durng the period 1995-97
largely reflect the structure presented in table 1, as can be seen from table 2.
Table 2: Sectoral composition of Fni in Mexico and Thailand
5.5
5.4
3.9
Thailand, industry
Electrcal appliances
Trade
Real estate
Other services
Other manufacturig
Chemicals
Metals and non-metallc
manufacturig
Constrction
Food and sugar
Textiles
Share of total FDI
52.6
26.0
25.5
5.8
5.7
5.7
5.0
Mexico,industry
Automotive
Tobacco
Bang and fmance
Wholesale trade
Basic iron and stee1
Communications
Beverages
Share of total FDI
9.5
6.6
6.3
5.8
5.7
5.6
5.6
Retail trade
Electrc. machinery
Electronic equipment
Source: UNCTAD 1998
4.3
2.8
1.6
The shares for Thai industries add up to more than a 100 percent due to significant
divestment in the petroleum product and the financial sectors. The figures are not
directly comparable since the data from Thailand are given at a much more aggregate
level than the Mexican data and the data in table 1. Note however, that all the top 10
receiving sectors in Mexico are also among the top 20 M&A sectors. The patte~ of
Fni in Thailand appears to be more concentrated in a few sectors; electrical
appliances, trade and real estate. These sectors are all found among the top 20 M&A
sectors and the top 10 Mexican recipients of Fnl. Even in Ghana, the service sector is
the most important recipient of Fni (71 percent) compared to 21 percent in
manufactung and 8 percent in agrcultue (UNCTAn 1998). Our model thus appears
to be largely consistent with obsered Fni patterns.
6 1998 saw a wave of mergers and acquisitions in the oil and gas sector as a result of restrcturig in
that sector. 1998 is therefore somewhat biased due to some mega-deals in this sector.
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